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Abstract. This paper proposes a semiring formulation for reasoning
about an agent’s changing beliefs: a dynamic epistemic semiring (DES).
A DES is a modal semiring extended with a revision operator. The revi-
sion operator is given a relational interpretation and a basic calculus is
developed – based on the revision operator a contraction operator is also
defined. A DES only models actions on an agent’s beliefs, whereas the
real dynamic epistemic semirings also introduced in this paper facilitate
actions on the world as well. To allow for iterated action both structures
are extended with the Kleene star.
1 Introduction
Formal reasoning about epistemic and doxastic notions in the 20th century can
be traced back to G.H. von Wright’s An Essay in Modal Logic [13] and Hintikka’s
Knowledge and Belief [5]. These books were written as attempts to philosophi-
cally clarify our notions of knowledge and belief using modal logic. In the works
of von Wright and Hintikka, the ones believing or knowing – the agents – cannot
change their beliefs, i.e. only static aspects of an agent’s beliefs can be reasoned
about. Alchourron, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson presented a semiformal framework
for reasoning about an agents changing beliefs [1] – this constituted the prelude
for the vast amount of research on belief revision done in the last two decades.
Segerberg was one of the first to make these streams flow together. In an array
of papers (see e.g. [9–11]) he proposes and develops a fully formal framework for
reasoning about an agent’s changing beliefs: dynamic doxastic logic. Dynamic
doxastic logic is, as the name discerns, a blend of dynamic and doxastic logic.
In more recent times, formal reasoning about knowledge has been put to use in
computer science, the standard references seem to be [4, 6, 12].1
Since Kozen published his axiomatisation of Kleene algebra (an idempotent
semiring with the Kleene star as the least fixpoint with respect to the canonical
order) [7] and also showed how to use an elaboration of it for program rea-
soning [8], there has been significant development and application of something
⋆ Work done while visiting Institut fu¨r Informatik, Universita¨t Augsburg.
1 The epithet epistemic is usually used in computer science, whereas in philosophical
logic one tends to differ between epistemic and doxastic. We will henceforth use
‘epistemic’, expect when referring to Segerberg’s logic.
that could be called semiring structures (some form of semiring equipped with
additional operators). The spirit in this development lies very much in the cal-
culational prospect of abstract algebra – tedious model-theoretic reasoning can
be reduced to simple, symbol-pushing calculations. One such development are
the modal semirings by Desharnais, Mo¨ller and Struth [3]. A modal semiring is
a semiring structure including a domain operator facilitating the definition of
modal operators in the sense of dynamic logic.
Our intent is to let yet another stream run up to Segerberg’s uniting work
by viewing some aspects of dynamic doxastic logic from the point of modal
semirings. In this paper we propose a modal semiring extended with a revision
operator: a dynamic epistemic semiring. This structure allows us to reason about
an agent’s changing beliefs in an elegant, calculational fashion. The carrier ele-
ments of the algebra are viewed as epistemic actions – actions working on the
agent’s beliefs. To check whether the agent believes a proposition we introduce
special actions: epistemic tests. Epistemic tests work like guards in program
theory, i.e. programs that check if some predicate holds or not. The dynamic
epistemic semirings do not allow actions on the world, or in other words, real ac-
tion is excluded (we assume that the agent’s beliefs are not a part of the world).
As a first step towards a semiring incorporating also real action, we introduce
real dynamic epistemic semirings. These are a combination of a modal semiring
– representing the world – and an dynamic epistemic semiring – representing the
agent’s beliefs. To allow iterated action both the dynamic epistemic semirings
and the real dynamic epistemic semirings are extended with the Kleene star.
The structure of the paper is: Section 2 defines modal semirings. In Section
3 the revision operator is introduced, in Section 4 we provide a relational model
and in Section 5 we develop a basic calculus. Section 6 elaborates the dynamic
epistemic semirings to the real dynamic epistemic semirings. The final section
before the concluding discussion extends the semirings with Kleene star.
2 Modal semirings
By an idempotent semiring we shall understand a structure over the signature
(+, ·, 0, 1) such that the reduct over (+, 0) is a commutative and idempotent
monoid, and the reduct over (·, 1) is a monoid such that · distributes over +
and is strict with respect to 0 (0 · a = 0 = a · 0). When no risk for confusion
arises · will be left implicit. We define the canonical order ≤ on a semiring by
a ≤ b ⇔df a + b = b for all a and b in the carrier set. With respect to the
canonical order, 0 is the least element, · as well as + are isotone and + is join.
A test semiring [2, 8] is a two-sorted algebra
(S, test(S),+, 0, ·, 1)
such that (S,+, ·,¬, 0, 1) is a semiring, (test(S),+, ·,¬, 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra
(BA) and test(S) ⊆ S. Join and meet in test(S) are thus + and ·, respectively,
and the complement is denoted by ¬; 0 is the least and 1 is the greatest element.
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We shall use a, b, . . . for general semiring elements and p, q, . . . for test elements.
On a test semiring we axiomatise a domain operator p : S → test(S) by
a ≤ pa · a, (1)
p(pa) ≤ p and (2)
p(apb) ≤ p(ab), (3)
for all a ∈ S and p ∈ test(S) [2]. Inequalities (d1) and (d3) can be strengthened
to equalities. The domain operator satisfies stability of tests,
pp = p , (4)
and additivity,
p(a+ b) = pa+ pb . (5)
With the aid of the domain operator, we can define modal operators [3] by
[a]p =df p(ap) and [a]p =df ¬〈a〉¬p . (6)
Therefore we shall call a test semiring with a domain operator modal.2 The
diamond can be read “after some way of performing a it will be the case that p
holds” and the box as “after every way of performing a it will be the case that
p holds”. The following fact
if p ≤ p′ and [a]p = 1, then [a]p′ = 1 (7)
is not hard to prove and will be used later.
3 Dynamic epistemic semirings
When reasoning about an agent’s beliefs and changes in the agent’s beliefs a
common way to go is to talk about the agent’s belief set and operators that
work on this set. The framework of Alchourron, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [1]
had three such operators, namely
– addition: add a belief to the agents belief set,
– revision: add a belief to agents belief set and revise the set so that it is
consistent, and
– contraction: remove a belief and ensure that it is not implied.
The addition operator can thus possibly add a belief such that it contradicts some
other belief. Moreover, it is possible for the agent to be ignorant (or indifferent)
regarding a certain proposition: the agent might not believe a proposition, but
this does not mean the he believes the negation of the proposition either. In
the present paper the agent will never hold contradicting beliefs and we will not
2 A relational model for modal semirings is given in Section 4.
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consider addition, we will only attend to revision and contraction. Our agent
will also not have the possibility to be ignorant, he will be fully opinionated and
have something to say about everything under his sun. We will therefore talk
about the agent’s belief state paralleling talking about the state of the world.
We shall now define the dynamic epistemic semiring, but first we provide an
informal intuition. The carrier set should be seen as actions on the agents beliefs
and upon these actions we shall work with four operators:
– + is choice: do either the left or the right action,
– ; is sequential composition of actions,
– pa denotes those states of belief from which it is possible to perform the
action a, and
– ⊛p revises the the agent’s beliefs by p (it is always possible to perform this
action).
We will have two distinguished actions, the fail action 0 which always fails and
the idle action 1 that leaves everything as it is. The tests (defined according to
the test semirings and named et) should be seen as actions that check whether
the agent believes a proposition or not: epistemic tests. If the agent believes the
proposition, the epistemic test will behave like the idle action, otherwise it will
behave like the fail action.
Definition 1. A dynamic epistemic semiring is a two-sorted algebra
D = (D, et(D), ; ,+,¬,⊛, p, 0, 1)
such that the reduct structure over
(D, et(D), ; ,+,¬, p, 0, 1)
is a modal semiring and ⊛ : et(D)→ D is a unary prefix operator such that
p ≤ ⊛p (8)
⊛p;⊛q ≤ ⊛q, (9)
⊛(p+ q); p = ⊛p, (10)
⊛p ≤ ⊛q ⇒ p ≤ q and (11)
p⊛p = 1, p 6= 0 (12)
hold for any p ∈ et(D) when ≤ is the canonical order. ⊳
We define a contraction operator ⊖p : et(D)→ D by
⊖p =df ⊛¬p (13)
for which the following basic properties hold:
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Proposition 1. In any DES the equations
¬p ≤ ⊖p, (14)
⊖p;⊖q ≤ ⊖q, (15)
⊖(p; q);¬p = ⊖p, (16)
⊖p ≤ ⊖q ⇒ q ≤ p and (17)
p⊖p = 1, p 6= 1 (18)
hold.
Proof. All statements are direct consequences of (13) and the axioms of ⊛. 
4 A relational model
We shall now give a relational interpretation satisfying the axioms of the above
structure. Given two binary relations S, T ⊆ Σ×Σ, define the binary operators
; and + and the unary operator p on the relations by the following:
(x, y) ∈ (S;T )⇔df ∃z ∈ Σ • (x, z) ∈ S and (z, y) ∈ T, (19)
(x, y) ∈ (S + T )⇔df (x, y) ∈ S or (x, y) ∈ T and (20)
(x, x) ∈ pS ⇔df (x, y) ∈ S for some y ∈ Σ. (21)
Moreover, denote the identity relation by∆ and define the unary prefix operators
⊛,⊖ : ℘(∆)→ ℘(Σ ×Σ)
by, for any given P ⊆ ∆,
⊛P =df {(x, p) | x ∈ Σ and (p, p) ∈ P} and (22)
⊖P =df {(x, p) | x ∈ Σ and (p, p) ∈ ∆− P}. (23)
Finally, let ¬ denote the complement relative to ∆ and let Ø denote the empty
relation. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let Σ be any set. The structure
(℘(Σ ×Σ), ℘(∆), ; ,+,¬,⊛,Ø, ∆)
is a DES when the operators and the constants are interpreted as above. More-
over, ⊖P = ⊛¬P .
Proof. The only axioms that need to be verified are those concerning ⊛ and ⊖,
the rest have been verified in [2]. The first axiom is verified by
(p, p) ∈ P
⇒ {[ property of binary relations ]}
(p, p) ∈ {(x, p) | x ∈ Σ and (p, p) ∈ Σ}
⇔ {[ definition of ⊛ ]}
(p, p) ∈ ⊛P,
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the second by
(x, y) ∈ ⊛P ;⊛Q
⇔ {[ definition of ; ]}
∃z ∈ Σ • (x, z) ∈ ⊛P and (z, y) ∈ ⊛Q
⇒ {[ definition of ⊛ ]}
(x, y) ∈ ⊛Q,
the third by
(x, y) ∈ ⊛(P ∪Q);P
⇔ {[ definition of ; and P ⊆ ∆ ]}
(x, y) ∈ ⊛(P ∪Q) and (y, y) ∈ P
⇔ {[ definition of ⊛ ]}
(x, y) ∈ ⊛P ,
the fourth by
⊛P ⊆ ⊛Q
⇔ {[ definition of ⊛ ]}
{(x, p) | x ∈ Σ and (p, p) ∈ P} ⊆ {(x, q) | x ∈ Σ and (q, q) ∈ Q}
⇒ {[ property of binary relations ]}
P ⊆ Q
and, finally,
p⊛ P
⇔ {[ definition of ⊛ ]}
p{(x, p) | x ∈ Σ and (p, p) ∈ P}
⇔ {[ definition of pand P 6= Ø ]}
∆
verifies the last axiom. That ⊖P = ⊛¬P is immediate from the definitions. 
5 Basic properties
In this section we develop a basic calculus for DESs. The first two propositions
are helpful tools.
Proposition 3. In any DES the equations
⊛p; p = ⊛p, (24)
p ≤ p;⊛p, (25)
⊛p;¬p = 0, (26)
⊖p;¬p = ⊖p, (27)
¬p ≤ ¬p;⊖p and (28)
⊖p; p = 0 (29)
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hold.
Proof. The first statement follows from axiom (10) setting q = 0. The second
statement follows from epistemic tests being a BA, isotony of ; and axiom (8).
The third statement is proved by
⊛p¬p
= {[ (24) ]}
⊛pp¬p
= {[ epistemic tests BA ]}
⊛p0
= {[ 0 strict ]}
0,
and the remaning statements follow directly from the first two and the definition
of contraction (13). 
Proposition 4. In any DES the equations
⊛p;⊛p = ⊛p and (30)
⊖p;⊖p = ⊖p (31)
hold.
Proof. The first statement is proved by
⊛p
= {[ (24) ]}
⊛pp
≤ {[ (8) ]}
⊛p⊛ p
and axiom (9) with q = p. The second statement follows directly from the first
and the definition of contraction (13). 
The next proposition settles additivity of ⊛ and isotony of ⊛ and ⊖.
Proposition 5. In any DES the equations
⊛(p+ q) = ⊛p+⊛q (32)
p ≤ q ⇒ ⊛p ≤ ⊛q (33)
p ≤ q ⇒ ⊖q ≤ ⊖p (34)
hold. However, ⊖ is not additive, i.e.
⊖(p+ q) = ⊖p+⊖q (35)
does not hold in general.
7
Proof. The first statement (additivity) is proved by
⊛(p+ q)
= {[ (24) ]}
⊛(p+ q)(p+ q)
= {[ ; distributive over + ]}
⊛(p+ q)p+⊛(p+ q)q
= {[ (10) and commutativity of + ]}
⊛p+⊛q ,
the second one (isotony) is straightforward from the first and the third statement
is a direct consequence of the second statement, the definition of contraction (13)
and contraposition. For the last statement, consider any binary relation P 6= ∆.
Then ⊖(P ∪∆) = Ø 6= ⊖P ∪ ⊖∆. 
Corollary 1. In any DES the sets
{⊛p | p ∈ et(D)} (36)
and et(D) are order-isomorphic. The set (36) is thus a BA with ⊛0 and ⊛1 as
its least and greatest element, respectively.
Proof. This follows directly from the isotony of star and axiom (11). 
The following proposition settles some relations between the constants, the do-
main operator and the epistemic operators.
Proposition 6. In any DES the equations
⊛0 = 0 = ⊖1 (37)
p⊛0 = 0 = p⊖1 (38)
p⊖0 = 1 = p⊛1 (39)
hold.
Proof. The first part is proved by
⊛0
= {[ (24) ]}
⊛00
= {[ 0 strict ]}
0
= {[ 0 strict ]}
⊖10
= {[ epistemic tests BA ]}
⊖¬00
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= {[ (27) and epistemic tests BA ]}
⊖¬0
= {[ epistemic tests BA ]}
⊖1.
The second part follows from the first statement and the fact that p0 = 0 and the
third statement follows from axiom (12) and the definition of contraction (13). 
Our last propositions settles that our semiring works as intended viewed in
the light of the reasoning-about-knowledge tradition. After revising with p the
agent’s belief state should be p. This is implicit already in (24), but it can also
be expressed more traditionally using the modal operators.
Proposition 7. In any DES the equations
[⊛p]p = 1 and (40)
[⊖p]¬p = 1 (41)
hold.
Proof. For the first part, calculate
[⊛p]p = 1
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬〈⊛p〉¬p = 1
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬p(⊛p¬p) = 1
⇔ {[ (26) ]}
¬p0 = 1
⇔ {[ modal semiring properties ]}
true.
The second part follows directly from the first and the definition of contrac-
tion (13). 
Slightly misleading, one can say that after revising with a “rational” proposition
(not the contradiction), the agent should not believe its negation. Similarly, after
contracting with a “rational” proposition (not the tautology), the agent should
not believe it.
Proposition 8. In any DES the equations
[⊛p]¬p = 0, p 6= 0 and (42)
[⊖p]p = 0, p 6= 1 (43)
hold.
Proof. The first part follows from
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[⊛p]¬p = 0
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬〈⊛p〉p = 0
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬p(⊛pp) = 0
⇔ {[ (24) ]}
¬p⊛ p = 0
⇔ {[ (12) and (4) ]}
¬1 = 0
⇔ {[ epistemic tests BA ]}
true.
and the second one is a direct consequence of the first and the definition of con-
traction (13). 
If the agent performs an “irrational” epistemic action, he might as well believe
anything.
Proposition 9. In any DES the equations
[⊛0]p = 1 and (44)
[⊖1]p = 1 (45)
hold.
Proof. The first part is proved by
[⊛0]p = 1
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬〈⊛0〉¬p = 1
⇔ {[ (6) ]}
¬p(⊛0¬p) = 1
⇔ {[ (37) ]}
¬p(0¬p) = 1
⇔ {[ 0 strict ]}
¬p0 = 1
⇔ {[ (4) and epistemic tests BA ]}
true
and the second part is a direct consequence of the first and the definition of
contraction (13). 
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6 Real dynamic epistemic semirings
In order to be able to express also propositions about the world and actions on
the world we introduce the real dynamic epistemic semirings. The basic idea
is that we work with two different kinds of actions: the real actions and the
epistemic actions. Real actions act on the world, and epistemic actions act on
the agent’s belief state. World tests check whether some proposition holds in the
current state of the world, whereas epistemic test play the same roˆle as above:
determining if the agent beliefs a certain proposition or not. There need be no
connection between the state of the world and the belief state of the agent.
Definition 2. A real dynamic epistemic semiring is a two-sorted algebra
E = (R × E,wt(R)× et(E), ; ,+,¬,⊛, p, (0R, 0E), (1R, 1E)) (46)
such that
– the structures (R,wt(R), ;R ,+R,¬R,
R p, 0R, 1R) and (E, et(E), ;E ,+E ,
¬E ,⊛E,
E p, 0E, 1E) constitute a modal and a dynamic epistemic semiring,
respectively, with the canonical orderings ≤R and ≤E ;
– wt(R) is isomorphic to et(E) and
– the operators are defined by, for any r, r′ ∈ R, e, e′ ∈ E, p ∈ wt(R) and
u ∈ et(E),
(r, e); (r′, e′) = (r;R r
′, e;E e
′) (47)
(r, e) + (r′, e′) = (r +R r
′, e+E e
′) (48)
¬(p, u) = (¬Rp,¬Eu) (49)
p(r, e) = (Rpr,E pe) (50)
⊛(r, u) = (r,⊛Eu) (51)
(52)
where ⊛ : R × et(E) → R × E. The canoncial order ≤ is defined by (r, e) ≤
(r′, e′)⇔ r ≤R r
′ and e ≤E e
′. ⊳
In the sequel we will omit the subscripts, no confusion need arise. We define the
contraction operator by
⊖(r, p) =df ⊛(r,¬p)
for any r ∈ R and p ∈ et(R).
The actions in in an RDES
E = (R × E,wt(R)× et(E), ; ,+,¬,⊛, p, (0, 0), (1, 1))
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can be divided in to three groups. The pure real actions {(r, 1) | r ∈ R} only
affect the state of the world, whereas the pure epistemic actions {(1, e) | e ∈ E}
only affect the beliefs of the agent. An action is mixed when it belongs to the set
{(r, e) | r, e 6= 1, r ∈ R and e ∈ E} and thus acts upon both the world and the
agent’s beliefs. Similarly the tests can be divided into three categories: pure real
tests {(p, 1) | p ∈ wt(R)}, pure epistemic tests {(1, p) | p ∈ et(D)} and mixed
tests {(p, p′) | p, p′ 6= 1, p ∈ wt(D) and p′ ∈ et(R)}. We also have special fail
actions. For any e ∈ D, (0, e) is a paralyze action – the agent fails to change the
world after having performed this action. For any r ∈ R, (r, 0) is a brain-killer
action – after having performed this action the agent can no longer hold any
“rational” beliefs. The bottom element (0, 0) is the ultimate fail action – the
agent cannot change the world nor his beliefs.
To change the agent’s beliefs, we have the pure epistemic action ⊛(1, p) –
this action moves the agent to belief state p, but leaves the world unchanged.
To illustrate, we prove the generalised case of (40). The box operator is defined
according to (6).
Proposition 10. In any RDES the equation
[⊛(1, p)](1, p) = (1, 1) (53)
holds.
Proof. The calculation
[⊛(1, p)](1, p)
= {[ (6) ]}
¬p(⊛(1, p)¬(1, p))
= {[ (49) ]}
¬p(⊛(1, p)(0,¬p))
= {[ (51) ]}
¬p((1,⊛p)(0,¬p))
= {[ (47) and 0 strict ]}
¬p((0,⊛p;¬p))
= {[ (26) ]}
¬p(0, 0)
= {[ (50) ]}
¬(p0, p0)
= {[ (4) ]}
¬(0, 0)
= {[ (49) and epistemic tests BA ]}
(1, 1)
proves the statement. 
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To relate the the world and the agent’s beliefs, conditions can be imposed on
the elements. We let φ denote the bijective mapping between wt(R) and et(E)
(written postfix). The state of the world p is thus reflected by the agent’s belief
state pφ. To express “if p is the state of the world, then the agent’s believe state
should be pφ” we can say that
(p, 1) ≤ (p, pφ). (54)
If we assume (54) for some special p ∈ wt(R) we have the following result.
Proposition 11. Let p ∈ wt(R) of an RDES and let (p, 1) ≤ (p, pφ). Then
[(a, 1)](p, 1) = (1, 1) ⇒ [(a, 1)](p, pφ) = (1, 1) (55)
holds.
Proof. The claim follows directly from (7). 
Any RDES has a relational interpretation as the following proposition shows.
It is not hard to prove, but quite tedious and we therefore leave the calculations
to the keener readers.
Proposition 12. Any RDES satisfies the axioms of a DES and any RDES thus
has a relational model.
The relational model presented for the DES may seem rather crude when RDESs
are considered. Another way of giving a relational model is to use the product
of the two components’ relational models – the operators are then defined in the
classical way according to the axiomatisation above, but taking into account the
special definition of ⊛. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 13. Any RDES can be given a relational interpretation as a com-
bination of the relational interpretations of the two underlying structures.
7 Dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra
To incorporate iterated action into our framework we extend the semirings with
Kleene star. A Kleene algebra is a structure over (+, ·,∗ , 0, 1) such that the reduct
(+, ·, 0, 1) is an idempotent semiring and the star ∗ satisfies the axioms
1 + aa∗ ≤ a∗ , 1 + a∗a ≤ a∗ , (56)
b+ ac ≤ c⇒ a∗b ≤ c and b+ ca ≤ c⇒ ba∗ ≤ c , (57)
for a, b and c in the carrier set. When the semiring reduct has a test set and a
domain operator the whole structure is called a modal Kleene algebra [3].
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Definition 3. A dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra is a two-sorted algebra
D = (D, et(D), ; ,+,∗ ,¬,⊛, p, 0, 1)
such that the reduct structure over
(D, et(D),+, ; ,¬,⊛, p, 0, 1)
is a DES and the reduct structure over
(D,+, ; ,∗ , 0, 1)
is a Kleene algebra. ⊳
Iteration a∗ of an action a should be understood as a repetition of a of any
finite length. A relational interpretation of star is the reflexive transitive closure:
given a relation R ⊆ Σ ×Σ we have
R∗ =
⋃
i∈N
Ri,
where R0 = ∆ and Ri+1 = R;Ri. Intuitively, repeating ⊛p more than once has
no more effect than performing the action once. Indeed, it is not hard to prove
that for any p ∈ et(D)
⊛p; (⊛p)∗ = (⊛p)∗;⊛p = ⊛p (58)
holds.
A real dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra is defined analogously to an RDES
having a modal Kleene algbra and a dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra as the
underlying structures and letting (r, e)∗ = (r∗, e∗).
8 Concluding discussion
This paper brings about, so we believe, a resolute first step towards epistemic
reasoning with semirings. But the theme is by no means played out, a lot remains
to be done. It is an interesting task to provide a semiring formulation where the
agent can be ignorant (or indifferent) regarding an issue: he does not believe a
proposition, but he does not believe its negation either. One step further would be
to also render contradictory beliefs possible – then the addition operator could be
introduced. Yet another possibility is to extend the structure with a top element
so that the revision operator could be defined – this might ease calculation. In
the relational model such a top element does exist. The completeness of the
revision operator with respect to the relational interpretation (in the sense that
everything that can be proved in the relational interpretation can be proved in
the axiomatisation) is a question that should be settled.
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The most important question concerning the dynamic epistemic semirings
is their usefulness in applications involving epistemic notions. A good place to
start would be to redo old applications, in order to determine the practical value
of our formulation.
We hope to be able to pursue these issues in future papers.
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